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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
Petitioner Lee Christensen ("Christensen") lists six 
questions presented to this Court. Respondent City of Monticello 
(the "City") respectfully suggests that the only questions which 
this Court could consider if it grants certiorari are: 
1. Did the Utah Court of Appeals properly 
dismiss Christensen1s appeal because he had 
not raised the constitutionality of a statute 
or ordinance in the justice court? 
2. Was Christensen denied his constitutional right 
of appeal? 
CONTROLLING PROVISION 
The City believes that the following statutory provision 
answers the questions presented: 
An appeal may be taken to the circuit court from a 
judgment rendered in the justice court in accordance 
with the provisions of this rule, except: 
(a) The case shall be tried anew in the circuit 
court and the decision of the circuit court is final 
except where the validity or constitutionality of 
a statute or ordinance is raised in the justice 
court. 
Section 77-35-26(13)(a), Utah Code (1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Christensen was convicted after a trial before the 
Monticello Justice of the Peace, Honorable S. Rigby Wright, of 
driving a motor vehicle within the City while his license was 
suspended or revoked. He appealed to the Twelfth (now Seventh) 
2 
Circuit Court of San Juan County, Utah, and the matter was tried 
anew before Judge Bruce K. Halliday on March 31, 1988. 
Christensen was convicted by the Circuit Court and a Judgment and 
Order of Probation was entered on April 21, 1988. 
Christensen then appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
While that case was pending, he attempted an interlocutory appeal 
of a Circuit Court order determining he was not impecunious, 
petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus to the 
Circuit Court, and petitioned for rehearing on the denial, which 
was also denied. After the filing of briefs, the Court of 
Appeals granted the City's motion to dismiss the appeal in a per 
curiam opinion, based on Christensen1s failure to raise the 
constitutionality or validity of a statue or ordinance in the 
justice court. City of Monticello v. Christensen, 769 P.2d 853 
(Utah App. 1989). He petitioned for rehearing and his petition 
was denied on March 22, 19 89. His petition for certiorari was 
1 
filed and served on April 24, 1989. 
Statement of Facts 
There is no record of the proceedings in the justice 
court, because the justice court is not a court of record. 
However, Christensen did file in the justice court a Demand for 
Rule 45 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, requires 
filing of the petition within 30 days after entry of the decision 
of the Court of Appeals. Those 30 days expired on April 21, 




Dismissal , which stated in full as follows: 
Comes now the defendant to demand that the charges 
in the above entitled case be dismissed against him. 
Defendant states to support motion, defendant is 
charged with DRIVING UNDER SUSPENSION, U.C. 41-2-
28, as adopted by Ordinanc (sic) in the city of 
Monticello. This Code does not apply to the 
defendant the defendant is not a resident of the 
state of Utah and has not had his Utah License 
suspended. 
Furthermore, defendant has now, did have at time of 
citation a Valid Wyoming License (Copy of Extract 
enclosed)., and is a residendent (sic) of Wyoming. 
According to Infomation (sic), and Discovery, the 
prosecution is basing it!s case on a letter from 
the Dept. of Public Safety, wherein it states that 
defendant's "Priveledge" (sic) is suspended. This 
only means that defendant may not have a Utah 
Driverfs License until the time specified is over. 
Defendant has not applied for a Utah Driver's 
License. 
Therefore defendant demands dismissal of charges. 
Christensen was convicted in justice court and appealed 
to the Twelfth (now Seventh) Circuit Court. He there filed 
another Demand for Dismissal, using essentially the same language 
as in the justice court, with addition of the following phrase: 
[S]ince the State of Utah is not empowered to 
suspend what the State of Wyoming has granted, the 
defendant demands that the charges against him be 
dropped. 
Christensen1s Demand for Dismissal was denied. 
2 
Christensen also filed a Demand for Counsel of Choice, 
demanding he be allowed to have someone of his own choice to aid 
him with counsel and other functions of the trial. He did not 
request that counsel be appointed for him by the justice court, 
Christensen1s sister appeared at trial with him. 
4 
Christensen has provided no record of the trial in the Circuit 
Court. It is clear from the briefs in the Court of Appeals that 
uncontested evidence was introduced at trial that Christensen1s 
privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Utah was suspended for 
one year on February 5, 1987, and that Christensen drove a motor 
vehicle in Monticello, Utah on September 3, 19 87. Christensen 
called no witnesses and did not testify himself. He was, 
however, permitted to introduce a copy of his Wyoming driving 
record, which showed that he had been issued a Wyoming license 
certificate. 
Christensen introduced no evidence that he is or was a 
Wyoming resident. The City does not agree that his possession of 
a Wyoming license certificate gives rise to any presumption that 
he is or was a Wyoming resident. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS CASE PRESEliTS NO ISSUE OF 
SUFFICIENT IMPORTANCE TO WARRANT 
CERTIORARI. 
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court sets 
forth four guidelines for granting certiorari. Christensen has 
not suggested that any of these are applicable in this case. He 
suggests that whether a state may suspend the driving privilege 
of a nonresident with a valid licence from another state is a 
case of first impression. The truth is that this issue was 
5 
resolved long ago. 
More importantly, that issue was not even decided by 
the Court of Appeals. It decided only that it lacked 
jurisdiction to consider the appeal because Christensen had 
failed to raise the validity or constitutionality oE a statute or 
ordinance in the justice court. Christensen does not suggest 
that the Court of Appeals1 jurisdictional decision was of 
sufficient gravity to warrant certiorari. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY 
DETERMINED ITS LACK OF JURISDICTION. 
Under Section 77-35-26 (13) (a), Utah Code (1988), the 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to consider appeals in criminal 
cases originating in justice court, only where the validity or 
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance was raised in justice 
court. It is clear that Christensen did not do so by his Demand 
for Dismissal filed in justice court. His Demand for Dismissal 
filed in Circuit Court added language asserting that the "State 
Both C.J.S. and Am.Jur. 2d state that one may be convicted 
of driving under suspension when one's "privilege" to drive is 
suspended by a nonresident state, even though a valid license is 
in effect in the home state. District of Columbia v. Fred, 281 
U.S. 49 (1930); Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1914); See 
61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, Section 639(2) and 7A Am.Jur. 2d, 
Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Section 148. See also State v. 
Milligan, 727 P.2d 213 (Utah 1986); People v. Matas, 200 Cal. 
App. 3d, 246 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1988); State v. Harkne^ss, 189 Kan. 
581, 370 P.2d 100 (1962); State v. Dalton, 13 Wash. App. 94, 533 
P.2d 864 (1975); State v. Justesen, 63 Or. App. 544, 665 P.2d 380 
(1983), review denied 295 Or. 846, 671 P.2d 1176 (1983). The 
Utah Legislature has defined license as the privilege to operate 
a motor vehicle. Section 41-2-102(9) Utah Code (1988). 
6 
of Utah is not empowered to suspend what the State of Wyoming has 
granted*" He offered no reasoning for his position, only a bald 
statement that Utah lacks the power to suspend the right of the 
holder of a Wyoming license certificate to drive in Utah. 
Whether this lack of power is based on state or federal statutes 
or constitutional provisions, and if so, what those provisions 
are, was never stated. He never even stated which statute or 
ordinance was infirm. 
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the 
statute challenged must be specified and the legal basis for 
the challenge must be presented by precise averments and legal 
argument, not conclusory allegations. It also correctly 
concluded that the challenge must at least be raised in the 
Circuit Court if the Court of Appeals is to conclude that it was 
raised in justice court. Christensen raised the issue in neither 
lower court. 
III. CHRISTENSEN'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
OF APPEAL HAS BEEN SATISFIED. 
Christensen asserts that the Court of Appeals denied 
his right under the Utah Constitution to appeal in all criminal 
4 
cases. Christensen did not make this assertion before the Court 
of Appeals. Furthermore, Christensen had his appeal from the 
justice court to the Circuit Court. The Circuit Court's review 
Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution. 
7 
was de novo, and could not have been more complete. 
Christensen1s appeal right was satisfied by that appeal. 
Additional appeals may appropriately be restricted to avoid 
clogging appellate courts with case^ ; already well considered and 
of relatively minor importance and to spare the City the expense 
5 
of seemingly endless appeals. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no issue here of sufficient importance to 
warrant granting certiorari. Christensen has had more than his 
share of judicial consideration in this matter. The petition 
should be denied. 
DATED this day of May, 1989. 
«£_ *L TT. H&bert Anderson 
Lyle R. Anderson 
ANDERSON & ANDERSON, P.C. 
Attorneys for City of Monticello 
P. 0. Box 275 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
5 Christensen, by the multiplication of his appeals, appears 
determined to render such economy ijlusory, at least in this 
case. It is to be hoped, however, that future litigants will 
learn a lesson from his experience. 
8 
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